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P ETER M ARGULIES∗

Reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act: A
Blueprint for Enhancing Privacy Protections and
Preserving Foreign Intelligence Capabilities
INTRODUCTION

The reauthorization of § 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA)1 in 20172 will
trigger a vigorous legislative debate. Under the current statute, the government
© 2016 Peter Margulies
∗
Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Colgate, 1978; J.D., Columbia Law
School, 1981.
1.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012) (amended 2015); see United States v. Hasbajrami, No. 11-CR-623, 2016 WL
1029500, at *4–13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016) (holding that § 702 was consistent with the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution); United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10–CR–00475–KI–1, 2014 WL 2866749, at
*7–9, *12–27 (D. Or. June 24, 2014) (holding that § 702 was consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution); [Name Redacted by Court], at 36–77 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf
(holding
that § 702 was consistent with Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution); cf. In re Directives
Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008)
(holding that the Protect America Act of 2007, a predecessor of § 702, was consistent with the Constitution).
For a sampling of the extensive commentary on the FAA, compare Chris Inglis & Jeff Kosseff, In Defense of FAA
Section 702: An Examination of Its Justification, Operational Employment, and Legal Underpinnings, HOOVER
WORKING GROUP ON NATIONAL SECURITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, no. 1604, Apr. 27, 2016, at 2–4, 15–19,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-faa-section-702-examination-its-justification-operational-employmentand-legal-underpinnings (discussing origins of the program and current legal constraints), and David R. Shedd,
Paul Rosenzweig & Charles D. Stimson, Maintaining America’s Ability to Collect Foreign Intelligence: The Section
702 Program, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, May 13, 2016, at 4–7, http://www.heritage.org
/research/reports/2016/05/maintaining-americas-ability-to-collect-foreign-intelligence-the-section-702program (noting § 702’s efficacy and downplaying privacy concerns), with LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE, 68–72 (Oxford Univ. Press 2016)
(arguing that the FAA is a threat to privacy that has not received sustained public scrutiny because of its
secrecy). See also Mieke Eoyang, Beyond Privacy & Security: The Role of the Telecommunications Industry in
Electronic Surveillance, HOOVER WORKING GROUP ON NATIONAL SECURITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, no. 1603,
Apr. 8, 2016, at 13–18, https://www.lawfareblog.com/beyond-privacy-security-role-telecommunicationsindustry-electronic-surveillance-0 (discussing proposals for reform, including requiring that upstream
collection and filtering for selectors be performed by private sector firms, which will turn over to government
only those communications that match particular selectors); David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and Beyond, HOOVER WORKING GROUP ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, No. 1601, Feb. 24, 2016, at 8–27, https://www.lawfareblog.com
/trends-and-predictions-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-faa-and-beyond (discussing future issues relevant to
FAA reauthorization); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1039, 1103–08 (2016) (discussing the framework for implementing § 702 and suggesting that the administrative
law model is the best paradigm for protecting privacy while ensuring effectiveness of program).
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Reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act
must obtain approval annually from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) of a certification describing procedures for collection of communications
likely to produce foreign intelligence information, in which one party is reasonably
believed to be located abroad.3 Some legislators, joined by privacy and civil liberties
advocates and former government officials, want to substantially limit the
government’s power under the statute.4 Others, convinced that the statute plays a
vital role in identifying terrorist and other national security threats, wish to
reauthorize the statute with virtually no changes.5 This Article argues that changes
to § 702 should strengthen technological safeguards for privacy, enhance
transparency, and expand the public voice at the FISC, but stop short of
surveillance critics’ principal goal: requiring a court order for all queries of U.S.
person data incidentally collected under the statute.
Even without taking that step, which would unduly hamper the collection of
valuable foreign intelligence information, there is plenty to do in reforming § 702.
First, consider the role of technology. Congress should expressly mandate that the
National Security Administration (NSA) use (1) the best feasible technology to limit
the incidental collection of U.S. person data, particularly through so-called
“upstream” collection at internet hubs, (2) scientific validation of all of its search
techniques, and (3) due diligence to determine the status of a target and whether
that individual is in the United States. However, as it moves to limit undue
collection of irrelevant data, Congress should recognize that dangerous gaps in
relevant data might grow as technology evolves. For that reason, Congress should
permit the NSA to collect data for the purpose of determining whether legitimate

2.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a note (amended 2015) (setting sunset date of statute as Dec. 31, 2017).
Id. at § 1881a.
4.
See Hearing on Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance between
National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016)
[hereinafter Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth Goitein, Co-Director
of Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law)
(suggesting that Congress should require that the government seek a court order for each specific query of
information on U.S. citizens, lawful residents, or persons physically located in the U.S. that is incidentally
collected under the statute); id. (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (suggesting that Congress should require that
government seek a court order for each specific query of information on U.S. citizens, lawful residents, or
persons physically located in the U.S. that is incidentally collected under the statute); see also Elizabeth Goitein
& Faiza Patel, What Went Wrong with the FISA Court, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Mar. 18, 2015, at 45–49,
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-went-wrong-fisa-court (setting out proposed reforms); cf.
Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing (statement of David Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board) (recounting testimony by then Chair of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board) (same).
5.
See Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 2; Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note
4 (statement of Kenneth Wainstein); id. (statement of Rachel Brand, member of Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board) (suggesting that any changes to the program can be made without amending the statute).
3.
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surveillance targets outside the U.S. are using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to
spoof U.S. IP addresses and thereby thwart surveillance.6
Congress should also mandate greater transparency. Transparency serves several
purposes.7 First, it allows Congress, the FISC, and the public to accurately assess the
size, scope, and nature of intelligence collection involving U.S. person data.8
Second, transparency also has a useful ex ante prophylactic effect.9 The prospect of
public exposure helps concentrate the bureaucratic mind, ensuring that officials
only advance and implement programs that they can defend. Congress should
require specific disclosure to the legislature of any and all instances in which the
FISC concludes that the NSA has overstepped statutory bounds or that the
government’s lawyers have been insufficiently candid in their filings with the FISC.10
However, transparency does increase the risk of disclosing intelligence sources and
methods.11 Furthermore, some information can be difficult to quantify and may
not appreciably add to public knowledge of intelligence programs.12 Accordingly,
Congress should resist calls to require the NSA to disclose the number of U.S.
person communications that it incidentally collects.13
In the area of judicial review, tailored reform should distinguish between two
different kinds of incidental collection of U.S. person data. Upstream collection at
internet hubs should be more closely regulated, as it is under rulings of the FISC
and current administrative rules.14 That regulation, which should include requiring
a court order for U.S. person queries, is necessary since upstream collection is more
likely to include U.S. person data that is wholly unrelated to foreign intelligence.15
In contrast, downstream collection is already tailored to foreign intelligence
targeting criteria;16 as a result, the U.S. person information incidentally collected is
6.

See Kris, supra note 1, at 22–24.
See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Elizabeth Goitein,
Co-Director of Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School
of Law); DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 149–50; Goitein & Patel, supra note 4, at 46; Rachel Brand, Transparency in
the Intelligence Community, LAWFARE (Nov. 2, 2015, 10:21 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/transparencyintelligence-community#.
8.
See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
9.
See infra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
10.
See infra notes 161–70 and accompanying text.
11.
See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text; see also Brand, Transparency, supra note 7.
12.
See infra notes 178–84 and accompanying text.
13.
See id.
14.
See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of David
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board); DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 151–52.
15.
See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Elizabeth
Goitein, Co-Director of Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law); DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 151–52.
16.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 34 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf; Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702
7.
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more likely to be related to foreign intelligence information.17 With respect to
downstream U.S. person data, this Article will demonstrate that requiring a court
order could hinder the timely acquisition of foreign intelligence information.18
In addition, FISC review of government certifications under § 702 would benefit
from the presence of a robust public advocate.19 Currently, the FISC has statutory
power to appoint amici curiae to assist in its deliberations and must explain in
writing why it has failed to do so.20 An amicus curiae pushes the government
toward greater clarity in its filings and prompts more precise and refined reflection
by the FISC. However, the FISC’s record on appointing amici continues to be
spotty. A November, 2015 opinion by Judge Hogan on § 702 benefited
immeasurably from the probing and diligent arguments made by amicus, Amy
Jeffress, a prominent Washington D.C. lawyer with substantial national security
experience.21 However, a December, 2015, FISC opinion by Judge Hogan of the
Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rachel Brand, member of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board);
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, 93 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702Report.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014].
17.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 34 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov
/files/documents/20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf; Senate Judiciary Committee May
2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rachel Brand, member of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board); PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16 passim.
18.
For a contrary view from former Vice President Walter Mondale, who as Vice President regarded the
original Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) as a dangerous expansion of government power
beyond traditional warrants to investigate criminal activity, see Walter F. Mondale, Robert A. Stein &
Caitlinrose Fisher, No Longer a Neutral Magistrate: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in the Wake of the
War on Terror, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2251, 2298–2301 (2016).
19.
In that respect, this Article shares the views of § 702’s critics and other commentators. See DONOHUE,
supra note 1, at 145–46; Mondale, et al., supra note 18, at 2297–98; Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and
Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1161, 1176–77 (2015).
20.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(2) (amended 2015); see also [Name Redacted by Court], at 5 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6,
2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf; In re
Application of the FBI for Orders Requiring the Production of Call Detail Records, No. [Redacted], at 24 (FISA
Ct. Dec. 31, 2015),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/12312015BR_Memo_Opinion_for_Public_Release.pdf.
21.
See [Name Redacted by Court], passim (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/20151106-702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf; see also Peter Margulies, Madison at
Fort Meade: Checks, Balances, and the NSA, LAWFARE (May 10, 2016, 12:45 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/madison-fort-meade-checks-balances-and-nsa# (discussing importance of
Jeffress’s work as amicus curiae). Another prominent lawyer, Marc Zwillinger, served as amicus curiae in a
recently disclosed opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR), which reviews
FISC decisions. See In re Certified Question of Law, No. FISCR 16-01, at 1 (FISA Ct. Rev. Apr. 14, 2016),
https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/FISCR%20Opinion%2016-01.pdf (holding that when court-authorized pen
register device that targets metadata, such as telephone numbers, results in incidental collection of post-cutthrough-digits (PCTD) – numbers, such as passwords, entered after placing a telephone call – such incidental
collection does not violate federal statutes or the Fourth Amendment if agency rules limit use of PCTD when
they constitute content, not merely call record information); cf. Orin Kerr, Relative vs. Absolute Approaches to
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FISC was unduly dismissive of the need to appoint an amicus.22 This inconsistency
does not serve the court in the longer term. It also disserves Congress, the public,
and the intelligence community, all of which benefit from the fullest feasible airing
of different perspectives at the FISC. A broader public advocate empowered to
participate in a larger range of FISC matters would enhance the FISC’s
deliberations.
The Article is in four Parts. Part I discusses the history of the FAA, and describes
the manner in which the government collects and uses data under the statute. Part
II urges legislative changes that would enhance technological safeguards for privacy
in foreign intelligence collection and use. Part III discusses judicial review and
other regulation of agency action under the FAA, arguing against requiring a
warrant for querying U.S. person information currently collected “downstream”
through internet service providers (ISPs). According to this Part, requiring a court
order to query downstream collection would hamper efforts to “connect the dots”
in counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, limiting FBI access to FAA data in ongoing
investigations would needlessly stifle the FBI’s efforts to find patterns in terrorist
activity. However, to make the FISC an even more robust monitor of best practices
in surveillance, this Part also argues that a more robust public advocate is vital for
FISC proceedings. Finally, Part IV suggests features that would enhance the
transparency of intelligence community (IC) practices for Congress, the FISC, and
the public. Overall, these changes will ensure that the § 702 program remains
effective, while providing greater privacy, legitimacy, and accountability.
I. THE FAA: HISTORY AND CURRENT PRACTICE

Congress enacted the FAA as a way to both enhance lawful intelligence collection
and subject it to meaningful constraints.23 Momentum for enactment of the statute
started with revelations in late 2005 that the Bush administration in the wake of the
9/11 attacks had unilaterally allowed the NSA and other agencies, collaborating with
the private sector, to collect both certain content information from
communications made or received by U.S. persons, and metadata such as the
numbers called.24 This broad surveillance effort, conducted outside any statutory
framework, was called the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).25 After a post-

the Content/Metadata Line, LAWFARE (Aug. 25, 2016), https://lawfareblog.com/relative-vs-absolute-approachescontentmetadata-line (discussing FISCR decision).
22.
In re Application of the FBI for Orders Requiring the Production of Call Detail Records, No.
[Redacted], at 23–24 (FISA Ct. Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/12312015BR_Memo_
Opinion_for_Public_Release.pdf.
23. See Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 4–8.
24.
See Kris, supra note 1, at 3; Shedd et al., supra note 1, at 2.
25.
William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles and Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633,
1641–43 (2010).
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disclosure interlude in which the FISC permitted a modified form of the TSP, at
least one FISC judge declined to reauthorize the program, highlighting the
importance of a legislative fix.26 Congress, in a bipartisan effort including thensenator Barack Obama, first passed the Protect America Act in 2007, and followed
that with the FAA in 2008.27
Under § 702 of the FAA,28 the government may engage in surveillance that
targets the contents of communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to
be located abroad when the surveillance will result in the collection of foreign
intelligence information.29 Under § 702, the government submits a certification to
the FISC describing its targeting protocols, as well as minimization rules that
diminish the probability that analysts will use or retain purely domestic
communications or irrelevant information about U.S. persons.30 The FISC reviews
these targeting and minimization protocols, although the FISC does not approve in
advance individual targets of surveillance.31
In addition, under § 702, foreign intelligence information that the government
may acquire includes data related to national security, such as information
concerning an “actual or potential attack” or “other grave hostile acts [by a] foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power.”32 Foreign intelligence information also
comprises information relating to possible sabotage33 and clandestine foreign
“intelligence activities.”34 Another prong of the definition is broader, encompassing
information relating to the “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
States.”35
Commentators have often acknowledged the effectiveness of the § 702 program.
For example, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which had
access to classified information in the course of its review of the program,
26.

Id. at 1643.
Id. at 1644.
28.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012) (amended 2015).
29.
Id. at § 1881a(a). For further discussion of this subsection, see Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global
Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2140
(2014); Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection
After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 17 (2014) [hereinafter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance].
30.
See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD, 135–36 (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP]. This
Article defines U.S. persons as U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, as well as persons physically located
within the U.S.
31.
Id. at 135–36, 152–53.
32.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(A) (2012).
33.
Id. at § 1801(e)(1)(B).
34.
Id. at § 1801(e)(1)(C).
35.
Id. at § 1801(e)(2)(B). See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause does not protect non-U.S. persons located outside the territorial
U.S.).
27.

28

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Margulies Page Proof v3 (Do Not Delete)

12/5/2016 8:11 PM

Peter Margulies
recognized § 702 had consistently produced helpful information about the
structure, operation, and plans of terrorist groups.36 The President’s Review Group
rendered a similar opinion.37 However, a balanced assessment of § 702 must also
weigh its costs to privacy38 and consider approaches for minimizing those costs.39
II. TECHNOLOGY IN THE SERVICE OF PRIVACY

Technology is a double-edged sword. Much has been written on how technology
constitutes a threat to privacy.40 Pursuant to § 702, the NSA makes use of cuttingedge technology to collect foreign intelligence information.41 Technology can be
intrusive if its uses are not controlled. However, technology can also enhance
privacy, enabling more effective constraints on government surveillance.42 When
intelligence collection with new technology risks heightened intrusions, Congress
should also insist that government use the best feasible technology to protect
privacy.
One example of this is described in the November, 2015 FISC opinion by Judge
Thomas Hogan. A recurrent theme in Judge Hogan’s opinion is the use of search
filters by law enforcement agencies such as the FBI to ensure that only trained

36.
PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16; accord Peter Swire, U.S. Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and
Reforms Since 2013 10 (Ga. Tech. Scheller Coll. of Bus., Research Paper No. 36, Dec. 18, 2015); Shedd et al.,
supra note 1, at 4 (noting the PCLOB’s finding “that the Section 702 program has indeed helped in the fight
against terrorism.”); Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 19–20.
37.
See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP, supra note 30, at 144–45 (noting that in great majority of
counterterrorism investigations since 2007 that “resulted in the prevention of terrorist attacks … information
obtained under section 702 contributed … to the success of the investigation”). But see DONOHUE, supra note 1
(taking a more skeptical view of intelligence programs’ effectiveness).
38.
See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 68–72 (noting privacy issues with § 702); cf. Margo Schlanger,
Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112 (2015)
(suggesting U.S. policymakers do not adequately incorporate the costs to civil liberties in the overall assessment
of program values); Rachel Brand, What Does Effective Intelligence Oversight Look Like?, LAWFARE (May 3, 2016),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-does-effective-intelligence-oversight-look (stating that agencies should ask
“whether they should engage in particular intelligence activities even if they can as a matter of law.”).
39.
See Ashley Deeks, Intelligence Services, Peer Constraints, and the Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J 1, 2 (2015)
(discussing constraining influence on U.S. of other states’ intelligence services); Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalising
Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 294–98 (2015) (discussing the merits
of establishing units in the U.S. executive branch to foster compliance with civil and human rights).
40.
See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 46–47 (Harvard Univ. Press 2015); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2021–22 (2013).
41.
PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 117.
42.
See John DeLong, Aligning the Compasses: A Journey through Compliance and Technology, IEEE
SECURITY AND PRIVACY, 85–86 (July-Aug. 2014) (discussing technology that enhances compliance with legal
rules); see also Ribert S. Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age, 126 YALE L.J.F. 8, 18 (2016) (asserting
that “technology can play an important role . . . in protecting privacy while enabling lawful collection of
information by the government.”).
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personnel have access to the § 702 database.43 As Judge Hogan noted, when FBI
personnel enter a query that results in a “hit” on data that those employees are not
cleared to see, a search filter blocks that data, although the querying employee does
receive notice that the search terms have resulted in a positive match.44 Agencies
can and do equip their software with the capability of sending alerts to supervisory
personnel when an employee attempts to gain access to data without
authorization.45
This software also facilitates audits that analyze unauthorized queries and find
patterns in such incidents.46 Improving alert and audit technology is vital to
enhancing compliance with legal rules. The FISC should receive updates on the
implementation of this technology as part of the certification process. In
reauthorizing § 702, Congress should require that the NSA and law enforcement
agencies implement the best feasible technology to perform these alert and audit
functions.
Another valuable example highlighted by former PCLOB Chair David Medine is
requiring the best feasible technology to reduce the incidental collection under §
702 of U.S. person information and minimize its use.47 The NSA collects § 702 data
in two forms: through specific requests to ISPs and telecommunications companies
(the PRISM or downstream program) and through scanning the contents of
international internet transmissions at hubs that comprise the Internet’s backbone
(the upstream program).48 Upstream scanning raises the risk of acquiring purely
domestic communications that the government can intentionally obtain only with a
traditional warrant.49 Without careful regulation, therefore, the scanning of
upstream communications could allow the government to circumvent a large part
of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections.
The potential to collect purely domestic content arises due to the Internet’s
architecture and current limits on the NSA’s own technological prowess.50 The

43.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 28 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (noting that technological safeguards
applicable to FBI queries of § 702 data will deny access to query information for an official who has not received
proper training or is otherwise not authorized to obtain access).
44.
Id.
45.
For further discussion of the importance of use restrictions reinforced by technological controls, see
Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205 (2015) (discussing the importance of use restrictions
reinforced by technological controls).
46.
See Litt, supra note 42, at 18.
47.
For further discussion of the importance of using the best feasible technology, see Senate Judiciary
Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 10 (statement of David Medine, Chairman, Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board).
48.
PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 7 (“There are two types of Section 702 acquisition: what
has been referred to as ‘PRISM’ collection and ‘upstream’ collection.”).
49.
Id. at 36–38.
50.
See Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 29.
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Internet divides and combines individual communications into packets.51 Devices
such as routers that manage packet transmission will take the most efficient path
available.52 Sometimes the most efficient path for a particular packet of domestic
communications lies through equipment typically used by foreign nationals located
abroad.53 An NSA device monitoring hubs used by foreign nationals overseas will
then pick up this domestic communication.54 An ISP may also change protocols in
a fashion that makes it more likely that some of the user’s communications will run
through such equipment.55
In upstream collection, the interaction of internet architecture and limited
technology yields an additional risk that the NSA will collect purely domestic
communications.56 Because upstream collection occurs at the Internet backbone,
the NSA obtains data in the form of communications “transactions.”57 A
transaction is any set of data traversing the Internet that a device aggregates or
divides to facilitate transmission. Internet transactions are two-fold.58 The first is a
single communication.59 The second, called a multiple communications transaction
(MCT), contains many individual communications.60 For example, at the internet
backbone hubs where the NSA, in partnership with ISPs, scans for upstream
collection, emails are often “bundled together within a single Internet
transmission.”61
As of April, 2016, public reports confirm that the NSA has been unable to design
and implement a filter that reliably and uniformly collects only those specific emails
in an MCT that are responsive to specific search requests.62 To collect the email that
meets its search criteria, the NSA must sometimes collect entire MCTs, analogous
to pages of personal emails.63 As with anyone’s email account, an entire page will
include numerous messages on varying subjects from a spectrum of senders.64

51.
PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 38; In re Government’s ex parte Submission of
Reauthorization Certification for 702 Program, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 157706, at 39–41 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011)
(Bates, J.).
52.
See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 56.
53.
Id. at 56–57.
54.
See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 38.
55.
Id. at 40.
56.
Id. at 40–41.
57.
Id. at 39.
58.
Id. at 41.
59.
Id.
60.
PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 41.
61.
See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP, supra note 30, at 141 n.137–38.
62.
See Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 12.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
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Some MCTs include messages sent between persons located in the U.S. – i.e., purely
domestic communications.65
While today’s technological limits oblige the NSA to collect MCTs, those limits
might ease tomorrow.66 For example, the NSA or private firms might develop a
scanning methodology that can reliably identify, isolate, and extract individual
selector-based emails within a larger packet, thus obviating the MCT issue.67
Congress and the FISC are not well-situated to determine what that technology is,
and when it will arrive. However, Congress can mandate that the NSA regularly
assess and update its methods to ensure that it uses the best feasible technology to
collect data upstream.68 Moreover, Congress can mandate that the government
include a representation to this effect in its certification for the FISC pursuant to §
702, and that the FISC review the government’s representation.69 Congress can also
require the Inspector General for the NSA to report to Congress on progress in this
area.70
This “best feasible technology” approach is flexible enough to give the NSA the
room it needs to innovate.71 The best feasible technology standard will not lock the
NSA into a particular method that is not practicable or scalable, or may be obsolete
the day after tomorrow.72 By the same token, the standard will oblige the NSA to
devote part of its technological prowess to technology that protects privacy.73 Given
the intrusions on privacy that are necessary in the NSA’s work,74 that seems like a
fair bargain.
Congress should also expressly require the NSA to use the best feasible
technology to evaluate its searches. Right now, anecdotal evidence suggests that the

65.

See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 41.
See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, RECOMMENDATIONS ASSESSMENT REPORT, 21 (2016),
https://www.pclob.gov/library/Recommendations_Assessment-Report.pdf (discussing Recommendation No.
6).
67.
Id.
68.
See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 10–11 (statement of David
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board) (recommending that Congress mandate that
the NSA update its technology and report to Congress regularly on its progress).
69.
See id. at 10–11 (recommending that the government be required to evaluate the effectiveness of
existing technology and investigate improvements).
70.
See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 75.
71.
See id. at 144 (suggesting that there should be an ongoing dialogue between the government,
telecommunications providers, and independent experts to ensure that the best technology is being used, and
that the determination should be continually revisited).
72.
See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 143–45.
73.
Id.
74.
See Jonathan Mayer et al., Evaluating the Privacy Properties of Telephone Metadata 5536 (Cynthia Dwok
ed., PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. vol. 113 no. 20, 2016) (utilizing digital research and probabilistic analysis to
show that collection of metadata such as call records can impose serious privacy consequences).
66.
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NSA lacks a uniform approach for evaluating the accuracy of its searches.75 In any
case, its governing statutes do not mandate development or implementation of such
a methodology.76 Although the NSA’s self-evaluation protocols are not publicly
available, it seems reasonable to assume that, overall, the agency follows what I’ll
call an individual expert judgment approach: in other words, it hires experts in
cryptology, computers, and the Internet, and creates an environment in which these
experts can develop their expertise in the service of the NSA’s multiple missions.77
That individual expert judgment approach presumably figures in NSA’s work under
§ 702.78 There is one major problem with the unadulterated reliance on expert
judgment: expert judgment is not always what it is cracked up to be.79 Sometimes, it
is neither particularly expert nor the exercise of judgment.80 Left to its own devices,
expert judgment can run aground because of biases and other flaws in human
inference.81 Studies of doctors, for example, show that medical decisions

75.

See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 86.
See NSA Reports to the President’s Oversight Intelligence Board (IOB), NSA (May 3, 2016),
https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/intelligence-oversight-board/index.shtml
(suggesting that rules may vary but they contain the same hallmarks).
77.
DeLong, supra note 42, at 85–86 (suggesting that technology may be the best way to support oversight
and compliance).
78.
It seems logical to assume that the NSA periodically reviews its work for evaluation purposes. Many of
those evaluations are useful for showing when the NSA is on the right track and when it must make additional
improvements. See id. (discussing the importance of workplace culture of inquiry and commitment to evolving
best practices). However, public reports do not indicate that the NSA has developed a systematic approach to
evaluating its evaluative methodology, to ensure that it consistently and comprehensively uses the most advanced
approaches that are feasible. Cf. PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16. Congress should require this and
periodic reports on progress toward that goal. If, for security reasons, any of this information must be
presented in a closed session or hearing, Congress has authority to conduct proceedings in that fashion.
79.
See Geir Kirkebøen, Decision Behaviour – Improving Expert Judgement, in MAKING ESSENTIAL CHOICES
WITH SCANT INFORMATION: FRONT-END DECISION MAKING IN MAJOR PROJECTS 169, 179–90 (Terry Williams,
Knut Samset & Kjell Sunnevåg eds., Palgrave-Macmillan 2009) (discussing how professional judgment is
inferior to simple statistical models and subject to emotional and motivational biases). See generally Stephen C.
Hora, Expert Judgment in Risk Analysis, Create Homeland Security Center 1, 1–11 (2009),
http://create.usc.edu/sites/default/files/publications/expertjudgmentinriskanalysis_0.pdf
(discussing
what
constitutes expert judgement).
80.
See Hora, supra note 79. See also Colin F. Camerer & Eric J. Johnson, The Process-Performance Paradox
in Expert Judgment: Why do Experts Know so Much and Predict so Badly?, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
EXPERTISE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITS 195, 202–11 (K. Anders Ericsson & Jacqui Smith eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (arguing that while experts are good at generating hypotheses and complex decision rules, those attributes
have little impact on their performance).
81.
See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders:
Accuracy, Admissibility, and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2003) (“Our thesis is
straightforward: actuarial methods have proven equal or superior to clinical judgments.”); Michelle M. Mello &
David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role of Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical
Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599, 605 (2008) (finding that doctors’ judgement errors were the most prevalent cause of
injury claims); Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Juvenile Justice, A.B.A. CRIM.
76.
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determined by an expert’s judgment are often wrong, failing to take into account
patients’ medical histories and responses to medications.82 All experts, including
those specializing in surveillance algorithms, are subject to these errors.83
Wrong calls at the NSA can have serious consequences. Those wrong calls can
result in two types of errors: false positives, in which the agency conducts
surveillance on people who have no relation to terrorism or any other national
security threat, and false negatives, in which the agency fails to detect threats.84
Some of the NSA’s searches may create excessive numbers in at least one of these
categories.85 However, these errors are not inevitable.86 Technology and methodical
human review can identify these errors, diagnose their cause, and point the way
toward better practices in the future.87 Congress should mandate the best feasible
technology to accomplish that result.

JUST. MAG., Winter 2013, at 10, 12–13 (observing that actuarial techniques for predicting recidivism among
offenders that rely on a common list of factors are more accurate than unstructured clinical assessments).
82.
For a sobering discussion of the incidence and range of medication administration errors by trained
nurses, see Steven D. Williams, et al., Causes of Medication Administration Errors in Hospitals: A Systematic
Review of Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence, DRUG SAFETY: INT’L J. MED. TOXICOLOGY & DRUG EXPERIENCE,
1045, 1063–64 (2013).
83.
Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 810–15
(2015) (arguing for application of Daubert test on scientific evidence for validation of computer search
techniques).
84.
False positives have drawn particular attention in the context of no-fly lists. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F.
Supp. 3d 1134, 1153–54 (D. Or. 2014) (holding that the low evidentiary standard for placement on the No-Fly
list combined with a lack of meaningful opportunity to be removed from the No-Fly list risks deprivation of
constitutionally protected liberty interests); see also Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909,
928–29 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that the government’s conceded error in placing plaintiff on a No-Fly list
violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights); Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65
EMORY L.J. 1313, 1318–19, 1346–47, 1351–53 (2016) (finding that the federal government’s process of putting
someone on the No-Fly list is unconstitutional and does not improve airline security); cf. Abdelfattah v. United
States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 529–31, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing plaintiff’s frustration
over repeated security checks possibly triggered by information in government databases and holding that
plaintiff could seek a remedy under both Privacy Act and U.S. Constitution, but denying relief on grounds that
the plaintiff had not established facts to support relief sought).
85.
See Peter Margulies, Surveillance by Algorithm: The NSA, Computerized Intelligence Collection, and
Human Rights, 68 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2657619.
86.
Id.
87.
See DeLong, supra note 42, at 88 (noting that “[t]he best way to achieve the benefits of technology in a
compliance program, while minimizing as many of the risks as possible, is to have frequent, meaningful, and
documented interactions among people, across all functional areas in an organization.”). Medical data analysts
have made substantial progress in this area. Cf. Ruben Amarasingham et al., An Automated Model to Identify
Heart Failure Patients at Risk for a 30-Day Readmission or Death Using Electronic Record Data, 48 MED. CARE
981–82, 986–87 (2010) (describing and evaluating a model that performed well in identifying heart patients
who, upon discharge from the hospital, were at great risk of imminent death or readmission; the model
facilitated the provision of services that would reduce these risks).
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An additional technological problem under § 702 is the uncertainty of using
Internet Protocol addresses as proof of the location of a target of surveillance.
Under § 702, the NSA can only target communications where one party to the
communication is a non-U.S. person “reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States.”88 However, IP addresses can be inaccurate. An IP address that
appears to be in Germany, Pakistan, or Hong Kong may actually belong to a user in
the United States, or may appear as a foreign “hit” in an NSA search because a
domestic user has accessed common, innocuous websites based abroad or domestic
sites containing links to overseas sites.89 Without additional information, NSA
collection may yield many false positives – people whose communications are
targeted even though these individuals are actually located in the United States
where the FAA precludes targeting by agencies such as the NSA.90 The PCLOB has
stated that the NSA already deals with the false positive problem by using due
diligence to ascertain a target’s U.S. person status and current location.91 That
exercise of due diligence can entail checking “multiple sources.”92 In reauthorizing
§ 702, Congress should write the due diligence standard into the law.
In expressly requiring due diligence to ferret out false positives, Congress should
also address the problem of false negatives, particularly those concerning VPNs.93
An individual can use a VPN to mask or “spoof” her IP address.94 While the address
might otherwise be readily recognized as being located outside the U.S., using a
VPN allows such individuals to communicate with an apparent IP address that
matches the VPN server’s location.95 As a result, an individual in Pakistan using a
VPN could communicate using an apparent IP address from the United States. An
Al Qaeda or ISIS member could use such a method to avoid surveillance under §
702. Congress should expressly permit the NSA to use multiple sources to ascertain
that a putative U.S. IP address is actually being used by a U.S. person or an
individual located here. The reauthorized statute should include a narrow
provision that permits the NSA to acquire information on U.S. IP addresses that
88.

50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012) (amended 2015).
See Letter from Jonathan Mayer, Stanford Univ. Sec. Lab., to Review Grp. on Intelligence and
Commc’ns Techs., Office of the U.S. Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence 2 (Oct. 3, 2013) (noting the frequency of
“[i]nstances where an American reasonably expects to interact with a domestic website – and is, in fact,
interacting with a domestic website – where his or her browsing activity may nevertheless flow across
international boundaries.”). The domestic site may be as harmless and generic as a site run by the U.S.
government itself, which features web apps sourced from abroad. Id. at 2–4.
90.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b) (2012) (amended 2015).
91.
See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 43–44; Kris, supra note 1, at 22–24 (discussing how
the NSA analyst must look at the totality of the circumstances when making a determination if the target is in
the United States).
92.
See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 43–44; Kris, supra note 1, at 23–24.
93.
See Kris, supra note 1, at 22 (discussing how VPNs operate in the context of location-spoofing).
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
89.
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appear to be linked to tasked selectors. The NSA should be allowed to engage in
this acquisition for the purpose of detecting spoofed U.S. VPNs, subject to
appropriate minimization procedures.96
III. THE FISC AND OTHER SAFEGUARDS: QUERYING U.S. PERSON DATA,
ESTABLISHING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE, AND CREATING A “COLLECTION
AVOIDANCE” EXCEPTION TO MINIMIZATION REQUIREMENTS

One central issue in § 702 reauthorization is whether Congress should require that
officials obtain a court order before querying incidentally collected U.S. person §
702 data. While some argue that any query for U.S. person information should
require a specific court order specifying the subject of the query,97 this approach
paints with too broad a brush. Instead, the requirement of a court order should
hinge – as it does under current NSA practice – on whether the NSA has collected
the data upstream or downstream.98 This section elaborates on this point. It also
urges that Congress establish a more robust public advocate for FISC proceedings.
The section then briefly addresses minimization requirements, arguing for an
express exception for data that aids the NSA in avoiding collection on targets who
have traveled to the United States.99

96.
See also infra notes 126–32 and accompanying text (discussing the implied exception to U.S. person or
locational collection for assessing when an overseas subject has traveled to the U.S., thereby requiring cessation
of collection, and suggesting that Congress make this implied exception express).
97.
DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 143; Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4
(comments by Sen. Leahy and testimony of Elizabeth Goitein of the Brennan Center for Justice).
98.
See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 56–57 (discussing the limitations on NSA analysts
when using a U.S. person identifier in both upstream and downstream collections).
99.
This Article does not take a position on whether Congress should amend the substantive provisions of
the FAA, such as the subsection that defines the foreign intelligence information that the government can target
for collection as including data “with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory” relating to the “the
conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B) (2012). Some insightful
commentators have argued that this provision appears overbroad, particularly to Europeans and tribunals such
as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). See Timothy Edgar, Focusing PRISM: An Answer to
European Privacy Concerns?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2015, 5:20 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/focusing-prismanswer-european-privacy-concerns; cf. Faiza Patel, Safe Harbor and Reforming Section 702, JUST SECURITY (Oct.
22, 2015, 11:25 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/27009/safe-harbor-reforming-section-702/ (discussing
concerns of both CJEU and U.S. privacy advocates). I agree that the U.S. needs to do more to convey to
European stakeholders that activity authorized by this provision does not result in the indiscriminate collection,
storage, or retention of the personal data of private citizens in Europe or elsewhere. See Peter Margulies,
Transatlantic Setback or Invitation to Dialogue?: EU Data Regulators’ Verdict on Privacy Shield, LAWFARE (Apr.
15, 2016, 9:52 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/transatlantic-setback-or-invitation-dialogue-eu-dataregulators-verdict-privacy-shield. Perhaps Congress can add a preamble to the FAA to this effect. The language
of any such preamble should avoid undue specificity about the collection authorized by the “foreign affairs”
provision, such as collection on any foreign government officials who may collude with foreign entities to
violate international trade agreements or other norms. Undue specificity could be counterproductive,
complicating U.S. diplomatic efforts and leaving the U.S. with fewer options in the complex arena of foreign
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A. Distinguishing Queries: Upstream v. Downstream
In considering whether to require a court order for querying incidentally collected
U.S. person data, Congress should distinguish between upstream and downstream
collection. Analyzing collection through this prism will produce tailored limits that
do not compromise an analyst’s ability to connect the dots. In contrast, ignoring
the differences between these two modes of collection could lead to dangerous gaps
in the data on future threats.
Importantly, the NSA, the Justice Department, and the FISC already understand
this distinction. The NSA has barred analysts from querying the upstream
collection dataset with U.S. person identifiers.100 Moreover, according to Judge
Hogan of the FISC, the FBI does not receive any unminimized information
obtained through upstream collection.101 According to Judge Hogan, this limitation
is crucial since upstream collection involves acquisition of MCTs. It therefore
collects a significant volume of information unrelated to tasked selectors.102 As a
result, the upstream program is “more likely” than other programs to include U.S.
person communications with no foreign intelligence value.103 Congress should
expressly bar both FBI receipt of unminimized upstream data and any U.S. person
queries by the NSA on communications incidentally collected under the upstream
program, or any other program that scans communications as they pass through
international Internet hubs.
Downstream collection presents a different calculus. In downstream collection,
an ISP aggregates the content of communications involving a U.S. citizen or lawful
resident (or another individual located in the U.S.) and a tasked selector linked to
an individual reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.104 Because
of these parameters, downstream collection is far more tailored than upstream
collection.105 Downstream collection does not entail obtaining MCTs, which can
include purely U.S. person content unrelated to a selector.106 Moreover, this
information may have foreign intelligence value that requiring a court order would
vitiate. Suppose the government wished to know if a known ISIS operative in Syria
or Iraq had emailed, telephoned, or described U.S. persons who have traveled
overseas to fight on ISIS’s behalf or might wish to do so. Further suppose that the

relations. See Peter Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs” in Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act: The Virtues
and Deficits of Post-Snowden Dialogue on U.S. Surveillance Policy, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1283, 1285–86 (2015)
[hereinafter Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs”].
100.
PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 56.
101.
[Name Redacted by Court], at 43 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
102.
Id. at 43–44.
103.
Id. at 44.
104.
Id. at 33–34.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
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NSA or the FBI had a list of persons in the U.S. whom it suspected were forming
such plans, but lacked sufficient evidence to obtain a warrant. The plans of a
terrorist recruit can change quickly, and a U.S. person planning to go abroad would
probably not give the NSA or the FBI an engraved invitation to the airport gate.
Even if the NSA or the FBI received some fresh information suggesting travel
abroad was imminent, drafting a request for a warrant and waiting for a judge’s
approval might consume too much time to stop the ISIS recruit.107 In this context,
requiring a court order prior to a U.S. person query would clash with U.S. national
security and foreign relations.108
The statute should continue to give law enforcement the flexibility to design
queries that yield useful information, whether or not those queries expressly focus
on foreign intelligence information. Judge Hogan of the FISC observed in his
November, 2015 opinion that the posing of “queries designed to elicit evidence of
ordinary crimes is not entirely unconnected to foreign intelligence.”109 Those links
are more likely since § 702 collection targets are persons reasonably believed to
“possess, receive, or communicate” foreign intelligence information.110 Given that
limited sample population of targets, contacts of the targets may also have such
links. As Judge Hogan hinted, it is far more likely within the tailored downstream
data set that a criminal scheme, involving identity theft, selling of contraband,
money laundering, or kidnapping, would be linked to international terrorism or
another foreign source.111 Judge Hogan was correct to assert that such links might
be rare, but would nevertheless be of “substantial” intelligence value when law
enforcement officials discovered them.112
Proposals to provide an exception from the court order requirement under
exigent circumstances113 do not grant the government sufficient flexibility. Indeed,
an exigent circumstances test would place the government in a Catch-22 dilemma.
In the needles-in-haystacks world of foreign intelligence, meeting an exigent
circumstances test requires access to data.114 Without data, the government is
engaging in speculation, not addressing exigent circumstances. However, without

107.
Cf. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008)
(noting that there is a “high degree of probability that requiring a warrant would hinder the government’s
ability to collect time-sensitive information.”).
108.
See id. (observing that requiring a warrant would “impede the vital national security interests … at
stake.”).
109.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 42 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 8 (statement of David
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board).
114.
Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST TERRORISTS, 77 (2008) (noting risks and potential benefits of counterterrorism data analysis).
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the ability to query incidentally collected U.S. person downstream data, the
government may not obtain the data it needs to discover exigent circumstances. For
example, without the ability to craft specific queries involving U.S. person contacts
of individuals abroad, officials might not learn in a timely fashion that a suspected
ISIS recruit’s travel abroad was imminent. Without that information, officials
would be unable to show exigent circumstances. Placing the government in this
bind sacrifices national security and foreign relations goals for marginal increases in
privacy.
B. Preserving the FBI’s Flexibility
For similar reasons, Congress should not limit the occasions that permit FBI
querying of the downstream § 702 database. Some surveillance critics have argued
that the FBI should be able to query downstream § 702 data only when the query
figures in a current investigation.115 The FBI’s current practice, which permits
queries in a range of circumstances, gives the FBI the agility it needs.116 Suppose
that monitoring of a known terrorist chat-room provides a lead that the FBI wishes
to check out by querying § 702 data. Encouraging that initiative will allow the FBI
to most efficiently “connect the dots.” Restricting the ability to query § 702 data to
a particular phase of an investigation stifles the FBI agents’ initiative and risks leads
falling through the cracks. That cabined mindset was disastrous in the run-up to
9/11.117 Reintroducing that rigid perspective would put a crimp in the FBI’s ability
to adapt to an ever-changing threat environment.
C. Build in a Robust Public Advocate
Rather than stifle the FBI agents’ initiative, Congress should institutionalize the role
of a public advocate at the FISC. A heartening element of the Hogan opinion is its
thoughtful response to the vigorous advocacy of amicus curiae Amy Jeffress.118 As a
number of commentators have noted, the addition of a public voice can only
improve decision-making.119 Indeed, despite modest cavils, the 2015 FISC opinion
115.
Cf. Robert Loeb & Helen Klein Murillo, A Comprehensive Look at the FISC Order Legal Analysis,
LAWFARE (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/comprehensive-look-fisc-order-legal-analysis
(criticizing the November, 2015 FISC opinion and urging greater limits on FBI queries of § 702 data); Marcy
Wheeler, Former Top Holder Aide Says Back Door Searches Violate Fourth Amendment; FISC Judge Thomas
Hogan Doesn’t Care, EMPTYWHEEL (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.emptywheel.net/2016/04/22/former-topholder-aide-says-back-door-searches-violate-fourth-amendment-fisc-judge-thomas-hogan-doesnt-care/.
116.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 29 n.27 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
117.
See Nathan Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT Act, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1795, 1795–96 (2010).
118.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 5–6 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
119.
See Wheeler, supra note 115 (praising Jeffress’s work as an amicus curiae); see also Margulies, Dynamic
Surveillance, supra note 29, at 51–55 (noting the benefits of a public advocate in FISC decisions); Vladeck, supra
note 19, at 1176–77 (emphasizing that “adversarial participation” in the FISC process would alleviate any
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has the qualities of deliberation one would expect of a decision by an Article III
court: the opinion considers alternative arguments and reasons carefully to a
conclusion – attributes that Alexander Hamilton extolled in Federalist No. 78,120 an
essay long considered the fount of wisdom on the virtues of judicial review.
Congress, in reauthorizing § 702, should enhance the public voice by moving
beyond the discretionary authority to appoint amici curiae established in the USA
Freedom Act to a more thoroughly institutionalized public advocate.121 That
advocate would be authorized to view a representative sample of § 702 selectors and
queries, including U.S. person queries.122 The public advocate would also be
empowered to petition the FISC if those queries or selectors appeared overbroad.123
One possible objection is that a public advocate with such expansive
responsibilities would also present greater security challenges. However, this
concern is less serious than it appears. A public advocate would have to be chosen
from the ranks of lawyers with wide experience in the executive branch. Such
lawyers would have a strong reputational interest in maintaining their credibility
with the intelligence community, Congress, and the courts.124 A lawyer with this
interest would be exceptionally diligent in maintaining secrets, protecting sources of
methods, and safeguarding other information vital to national security.125
D. Collection Avoidance and Minimization
While minimization of data entails healthy limits on officials’ access to irrelevant
information, current NSA practice acknowledges that in certain situations an
exception to minimization can enhance privacy. The FISC has recognized an
implicit exception to minimization rules when information is useful in collection
avoidance, i.e., in stopping collection in a timely manner when an overseas target’s
travel to the U.S. renders continued surveillance illegal.126 Congress should codify
this exception.

Article III problems); Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA “Special Advocate,”
JUSTSECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34pm), https://www.justsecurity.org/2873/fisa-special-advocate-constitution/
(indicating that there is no harm in having an extra lawyer participate in the decision-making process).
120.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 489–94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
121.
Emily Berman, The Two Faces of the Foreign Surveillance Court, 91 IND. L.J. 1191, 1241 (2016)
(emphasizing the importance of the adversarial process in FISA Court proceedings).
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict
Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 509–13 (1994) (noting that lawyers, as “repeat-players” in
litigation, often choose strategies that protect their reputations with other stakeholders in the process).
125.
Both Congress and the FISC obviously took this view of the role of the amici curiae. Congress would
not have provided for a panel of amici, and the FISC would not consider appointing them, if security were a
concern.
126.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 66–68 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
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Minimization is a requirement pursuant to the statute to ensure that agencies do
not retain personal data for a longer period than necessary.127 Under the statutory
framework governing § 702 foreign intelligence collection, this is a major concern
regarding U.S. person information.128
Agencies must typically purge this
information within a specific period of time (five years or less) unless it is relevant
to a foreign intelligence purpose or is evidence of a crime.129
However, the NSA informed the FISC in 2015 that for a number of years it had
retained information longer for collection avoidance reasons.130
Consider
information collected when a surveillance target abroad entered the U.S. (in NSA
parlance, became a “roamer”) and then used personal information linked to a U.S.
person during that U.S. visit. A “roamer” (who could be a terrorist, arms trafficker,
diplomat, etc.) could use an email address that the NSA had tasked as a “selector”
for collection purposes, but send those emails from an IP address associated with a
U.S. person with whom the target was staying during the target’s visit to this
country. The NSA loads such data into a technological tool it uses to evaluate
“alerts” it receives when a target may have entered the U.S.131 This use may be
outside of any express statutory exception, but the NSA has described it as an
implicit exception, since the information is retained not for collection or querying,
but instead only for the limited purpose of determining when collection should
cease.132 Judge Hogan of the FISC ultimately found that such an implicit exception
was appropriate.133
Congress should make this implicit exception express. Eliminating the exception
would hinder the NSA in determining when a target had entered the United States.
It would therefore force the agency to be even more intrusive, not less. To resolve
the problem, Congress should include language that expressly authorizes the NSA
to retain data used strictly for collection avoidance.

127.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2012) (amended 2015) (requiring that agencies adopt “specific procedures
. . . that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance to minimize
the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of non-publicly available information concerning
unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and
disseminate foreign intelligence information”); cf. PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 50–51
(explaining minimization under the statute).
128.
See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 50–51.
129.
Id. at 60.
130.
See [Name Redacted by Court] at 66–68 (FISC Ct. Nov. 6 2015) (noting that the NSA did not comply
with requirements to age off communications collected in conjunction with the FBI within a fivc year period).
131.
Id. at 67–68 (explaining the process used to resolve alerts).
132.
See id. (noting that the Government has modified procedures to justify when communication
collection is kept for longer than five years).
133.
Id. at 70–71. The FISC concluded that the NSA Minimization Procedures do not prohibit the NSA
from keeping data for longer periods of time in an effort to ensure homeland safety. Id.
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IV. TRANSPARENCY

Transparency is another vital factor in § 702 reauthorization. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has provided unprecedented transparency
in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations.134 Moreover, the USA Freedom Act
has introduced further openness.135 However, more needs to be done.
A. Transparency’s Virtues and Risks
Transparency has several virtues in democratic governance. First, it allows
Congress, the FISC, and the public to accurately assess the size, scope, and nature of
intelligence collection involving U.S. person data.136 Transparency also allows these
stakeholders to understand how the branches of government work together to
review and oversee intelligence collection.137 With the benefit of transparency,
stakeholders can see if the FISC has been unduly deferential to the government or if
it has made intelligence collection needlessly cumbersome.
Second, transparency has a useful ex ante effect. The prospect of public exposure
helps concentrate the bureaucratic mind, ensuring that officials only advance and
implement programs that they can defend.138 In a system that lacks express
transparency requirements, officials may overreach, with groupthink encouraging
the illusion that unduly expansive interpretations of legal authorities will never be
subject to public scrutiny.139 That heedless mindset is a collective illusion, since
leaks from disgruntled personnel like Snowden will eventually result in public
disclosure.140 An up-front transparency requirement rids officials of that illusion of
opacity, forcing them to formulate and implement programs with an eye toward the

134.
For an insightful analysis of transparency’s risks and benefits, see Brand, Transparency, supra note 7;
see also Carrie Cordero, The DNI’s New Transparency Implementation Plan, LAWFARE (Oct. 27, 2015, 2:00 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/dnis-new-transparency-implementation-plan (describing transparency principles
announced by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper).
135.
See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 292 (2015).
136.
See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 149 (discussing the vital function that transparency plays in a
democratic state).
137.
Id.
138.
See Jack Goldsmith, A Partial Defense of the Front-Page Rule, HOOVER INST.: THE BRIEFING (Jan. 29,
2014), http://www.hoover.org/research/partial-defense-front-page-rule (noting that disclosures have forced the
intelligence community to justify itself and address tradeoffs that it could ignore when its activities remained
secret).
139.
See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1415–16 (2009)
(discussing causes and effects of groupthink); Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential
Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 871–73 (2011) (analyzing the impact of
groupthink on the functionality of executive agencies).
140.
See Goldsmith, supra note 138.
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best public justifications they can present. In a democracy, that early focus on
public justifications is generally the best default position for government.141
Transparency also buttresses the legitimacy of government programs.
Perceptions of legitimacy rise if the current rules work and government is actually
following those rules.142 Transparency can rebut surveillance critics who claim that
overreaching is the norm.
However, decreeing transparency as a universal default position can also trigger a
negative effect on decision-making. Lawmakers and the public intuitively
understand that in areas such as attorney-client privilege, the law requires
confidentiality to avoid chilling communication.143 The same concerns affect the
formation and implementation of public policy. The Framers recognized that
sometimes a fishbowl is not the ideal venue for complex decisions involving
national security and foreign affairs.144 In some contexts, disclosure of policies will
limit policymakers’ options and undermine a decision’s implementation.145 For
example, the Obama administration decided to make overtures to Iran that
ultimately resulted in the U.S.-Iran nuclear accord.146 Early disclosure of those
overtures might have scuttled negotiations with Iran, locking the administration
into a hostile stance. In the domain of surveillance, undue transparency can tip off
adversaries and encourage them to modify their tactics to evade detection.147
B. Current Examples of Transparency
U.S. intelligence has made extraordinary strides toward greater transparency after
Snowden’s disclosures. Brief discussion of those innovations provides concrete
evidence of transparency’s virtues and also helps identify areas for further reforms.

141.
See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 149–50 (noting that the public discussion of the necessity for
transparency in surveillance gathering has surfaced since the Snowden leaks).
142.
Id.
143.
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (attorney-client privilege “encourages full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promotes broad public interests in
the observe of law and the administration of justice”).
144.
See Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs,” supra note 99, at 1284, 1295 (noting that while the Framers
believed in the value of transparency, they understood the utility of secrecy at times).
145.
See id. at 1295–96 (noting that the Framers recognized that premature disclosure could adversely affect
certain policy options’ effectiveness).
146.
Cf. Asli U. Bali, Negotiating Nonproliferation: International Law and Delegation in the Iranian Nuclear
Crisis, 61 UCLA L. REV. 232, 269 (2014) (discussing that overtures of Obama resulted from the first high-level
bilateral meeting between America and Iran in thirty years).
147.
Cf. Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 29, at 28 (noting that detailed government disclosure
can impair surveillance and limit the choices available to decision makers).
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After Snowden’s leaks, the ODNI began to release important FISC opinions.148
The USA Freedom Act mandated continuation of this process.149 The result has
been two-fold. First, disclosure of FISC opinions has made clear that the court’s
judges wrestle with the difficult problems of intelligence collection. For example,
Judge Reggie Walton expressed deep concern for wayward NSA practices that led to
the use of identifiers under § 215 of the USA Patriot Act [now USAF] for which the
agency lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion (RAS) of links to terrorism.150
Judge Walton ordered the Justice Department for a period of almost one year to
submit all proposed identifiers to the FISC for advance approval.151 The court
permitted continuation of the program only when the Justice Department had
conclusively demonstrated that it had overhauled its collection protocols to
eliminate the problem of non-RAS-approved identifiers.152
In the realm of ongoing NSA collection, Congress has already sought
transparency in the USA Freedom Act, particularly the Act’s requirement that the
NSA disclose the number of U.S. persons, specifically U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents (LPRs) who have been subject to queries of data incidentally
collected under § 702.153 On an annual basis, the NSA must publish a “transparency
report” that discloses this and similar information about the impact of § 702
surveillance on U.S. persons.154
This report is useful. For example, the 2015 report revealed that the NSA
obtained under 5,000 court orders for querying the § 702 dataset regarding the
content of U.S. persons’ communications.155 Armed with that number, Congress,
the FISC, and the public – including privacy and civil liberties advocates – can
assess how the NSA uses incidental collection. Moreover, these stakeholders can see
trends in the numbers. If the NSA is collecting markedly more content in a given
year, compared to the previous year, stakeholders can ask why. Perhaps there are
more terrorists among U.S. persons (including youths recruited to join ISIS in Syria
and Iraq). Or perhaps the NSA is becoming too eager to conduct surveillance and

148.
For a recent sampling, see Cody M. Poplin, ODNI Releases Three FISC Opinions, LAWFARE (Apr. 20,
2016, 1:25 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/odni-releases-three-fisc-opinions.
149.
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 292 (2015).
150.
See In re Production of Tangible Things, BR 08-13, at 4–5 (FISC Ct. Mar. 2, 2009).
151.
Id.
152.
Id.; see also John DeLong & Susan Hennessey, Understanding Footnote 14: NSA Lawyering, Oversight,
and Compliance, LAWFARE (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-footnote-14-nsalawyering-oversight-and-compliance (discussing this episode).
153.
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, 129 Stat. at 292–93 (providing mandatory reporting requirements
regarding United States persons).
154.
Id.
155.
See generally Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statistical Transparency Report Regarding
Use of National Security Authorities – Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2015, IC ON THE RECORD (May 2,
2016), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2015.
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collection. The answer may be the first alternative, the second, or a mix of the two.
Obliging the NSA to report this information allows stakeholders to ask the crucial
questions. It also obliges the NSA to monitor its own practices in the anticipation of
such stakeholder inquiries. That complementarity between transparency and
internal constraints is a vital asset that Congress should enhance in the FAA’s
reauthorization.
For example, the NSA has agreed with the PCLOB’s recommendation that the
NSA provide the FISC with a sample of queries and selectors used by the agency.156
That is a helpful development, as Judge Hogan indicated in his November, 2015
opinion.157 Congress should provide expressly that the NSA will furnish such
samples periodically to the FISC. However, more is needed.
C. The FISC and Transparency
Congress should do more to mandate that Congress and the public know more
about the procedures followed by the FISC. Independent reviews have indicated
that the FISC is not a rubber stamp.158 Nonetheless, this Article has argued that an
institutionalized public advocate would refine the FISC’s deliberations. With or
without a full-time public advocate, however, more transparency about the FISC’s
proceedings would benefit both Congress and the public.
Congress should do more to facilitate public awareness of the give-and-take at
the FISC. For example, Congress should mandate that the Justice Department
publicly disclose on an annual basis the number of times that the FISC requires
additional information from government attorneys before approving querying of
U.S. person information.159 Those statistics would, like the statistics on the total
number of court orders approving U.S. person queries, provide a baseline for future
analysis. If the rate of FISC requests for further information increased markedly in
a given year, that might indicate that the government was becoming too broad in its
initial requests. Legislators and privacy advocates could use that information to
push for greater precision in initial applications. Perhaps this inference was
unfounded; if so, the intelligence community could push back and convince the
doubters. This dialectic would not entail disclosure of intelligence sources or
methods; it might merely involve a more open discussion of intelligence agencies’
guiding philosophy, supplemented as needed by closed legislative hearings to drill

156.

See [Name Redacted by Court], at 46–47 n.36 (FISC Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
Id.
158.
See PCLOB § 702 REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that the FISC’s review of § 702
certifications “is not limited to the four corners of [agency] documents. The FISC also takes into consideration
additional filings by the government to supplement or clarify the record, responses to FISC order to supplement
the record, and the sworn testimony of witnesses at hearings.”) (citations omitted).
159.
A publicly disclosed net figure would not need to include identifying information about the subject of
each query.
157.
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down into the details. That conversation, like many of the public conversations
about intelligence policy that took place in the wake of Edward Snowden’s
disclosures, would be healthy for democracy.160
Furthermore, Congress should require that the government disclose all occasions
in which the FISC has commented adversely on the candor of government lawyers,
or expressed the view that those lawyers had needlessly delayed in disclosing
episodes of compliance. For example, in his November, 2015 opinion, Judge
Hogan remonstrated with government attorneys, asserting that they had not been
sufficiently forthcoming in explaining implementation of a policy that was several
years old and retained U.S. person data when that data was helpful in “collection
avoidance.”161 As explained earlier, the government argued that the minimization
requirements had an “implicit exception” for collection avoidance.162 That
exception entailed certain U.S. person information that was helpful in flagging
entry into the U.S. by certain overseas targets (roamers) who, by virtue of entry into
the U.S., were no longer appropriate subjects for warrantless collection.163 Since the
government should cease such collection as soon as possible, information that
would flag the U.S. entry of targets is useful for compliance with both statutory and
constitutional obligations.164 However, according to Judge Hogan, the NSA had
interpreted the implicit exception too broadly, retaining records that it should have
purged.165 The government argued that it had informed the FISC; however, the
FISC indicated in its opinion that this disclosure had not been sufficiently clear.166

160.
If the number stayed steady, stakeholders would have greater assurance of continuity in the NSA’s
stance. Either way, the result would be greater legitimacy for the agency.
161.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 58–59 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015); id. at 66–68 (observing that the
court was “extremely concerned about the NSA’s failure to comply” with its own minimization procedures).
162.
See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
163.
[Name Redacted by Court], at 66–68 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
164.
Id.
165.
Id. at 57–58.
166.
See id. at 58 (criticizing the the government’s “failure to convey . . . explicitly” to the court that the
agency had continued to retain certain information otherwise subject to purge); see also id. at 59 (accepting the
government’s explanation that some incomplete purges had resulted from technical errors that the agency was
working to correct). For a valuable account of an NSA compliance issue that involved an interpretation of
authority to collect domestic metadata, see DeLong & Hennessey, supra note 152 (discussing the FISC’s
disagreement with interpretation by NSA counsel regarding whether search terms used to query daily stream of
new call records had to comply with standard of “reasonable and articulable suspicion” of links to terrorism
that FISC had imposed on querying of “archived data”). The FISC’s concerns about candor do not mean that
government lawyers were acting in bad faith. Many of these disputes – perhaps all – involved good faith
disagreements. My only point here is that the FISC’s perceptions matter more than any single lawyer’s
subjective intent. Because of the importance of the FISC’s perceptions, the agency should highlight to Congress
any concerns on this score that the court has advanced.
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Candor is even more vital in ex parte proceedings like those under § 702, where
there is no other party to bring to light inaccurate or incomplete assertions.167
Any incidents perceived by the FISC as reflecting a lack of candor by the
government’s lawyers also have a corrosive effect on the intelligence community’s
legitimacy. Repeat players in adjudications or transactions know that their
reputation is key to their success.168 Based on the trial lawyer’s familiar maxim,
“false in one thing, false in all,”169 shortfalls in candor in one matter will injure an
agency’s reputation, ultimately calling into question the accuracy of all agency
positions.170 Any episode that leads the FISC to question the government’s candor
should be brought to Congress’ attention so that Congress can determine for itself
whether the government was sufficiently forthcoming and take appropriate action if
Congress determines that greater candor was needed. Ideally, even the prospect of
such congressional inquiries will spur the government to bend over backwards in
the name of candor. That would be an entirely salutary development; the
government should aim to be comprehensive in its disclosures to the FISC, since
otherwise the framework simply cannot work as Congress intended.
D. Properly Recording FBI Queries
Reform is also needed in the way that the FBI records queries that yield outputs
from the § 702 database. Currently, the FBI does not classify as a query a database
search done by FBI personnel not authorized to view § 702 data.171 That approach
seems to stand transparency principles on their head: surveillance stakeholders have
a legitimate interest in discovering the volume of search requests made by personnel
not eligible to see the results of those requests. A high volume of requests of this
sort would indicate that the FBI is either wasting its agents’ time or seeking to access
information in violation of internal rules. Either development should trigger
outside scrutiny. To address this issue, the FBI’s protocol requires revision.
Here is what the FBI currently does, per Judge Hogan’s November FISC
opinion.172 Suppose that an FBI employee who does not have clearance under FBI
rules to access the § 702 dataset inputs a search request. Because of automatic
167.
[Name Redacted by Court], at 59 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (describing the “heightened duty of candor
in ex parte proceedings”); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (providing
that in an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer “shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that
will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision”); James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial
Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1446–47, 1464–65
(2015) (discussing centrality of candor in ex parte proceedings).
168.
See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 124.
169.
Falsus In Uno Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
170.
The key factor under the FAA framework is the view of the FISC, not whether, on some construction
of the law or facts, the government’s position might be justifiable.
171.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 28 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
172.
Id. at 28–29.
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controls, that employee will not be able to view the results of that search.173
However, the employee will receive a notice of a “hit” if the search does turn up
information that fits the search terms.174 In this situation, the employee’s supervisor
or a higher-ranking national security employee at the FBI may authorize the
employee who conducted the original search to access the material, but only if the
search output “reasonably appears” to be foreign intelligence information, to be
“necessary to understand foreign intelligence information, or to be evidence of a
crime.”175 If it is unclear, the original employee can gain access to the search result
“solely” to discern whether the result meets this test.176 However, the FBI does not
count such searches as queries.177 Congress should require that the FBI change its
approach.
A search request is a “query,” in common parlance. It should be classified and
recorded as such. Failing to count such a request as a query relies on a strained and
counterintuitive definition of the term, “query.” In the post-Snowden era, officials
should avoid these strained definitions. In the transparency context, treating even a
frustrated search as a query is the only way to properly align incentives for FBI
employees who lack access to § 702 data; otherwise, those employees always have a
work-around available, even if they formulate a search that they know is likely to
obtain such data. Recording search requests as queries when they uncover § 702
data promotes stakeholder review, without unduly chilling agents’ initiative.
E. Transparency’s Limits: The Chimera of Quantifying Total Incidental Collection
However, some proposals for transparency in surveillance are either risky or
irrelevant to the core concerns that should drive § 702’s reauthorization. For
example, some commentators have requested that the NSA provide an estimate of
the number of U.S. persons whose data is incidentally collected pursuant to § 702.178
As the following paragraphs demonstrate, this proposal for quantification of
incidental collection is impracticable and could potentially undermine both
national security and privacy.
The key to impracticability of the quantification proposal is its failure to
acknowledge a vital aspect of § 702 highlighted in this Article: the difference
between upstream and downstream collection.179 Providing an estimate of
incidentally collected U.S. person data in the upstream program is exceptionally
173.

Id. at 28.
Id.
175.
Id. at 29.
176.
Id.
177.
See [Name Redacted by Court], at 28 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
178.
See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 11–12 (statement of David
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board).
179.
See supra notes 63–81 and accompanying text.
174.
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difficult since the upstream program’s stationing at internet hubs means that the
number may fluctuate wildly with routers’ search for the most efficient pathways
for transmitting messages.180 Moreover, the MCTs unavoidably collected (given
current technology) under the upstream program will also fluctuate with respect to
U.S. person content – some MCTs will have higher content, others less, depending
on technical details of internet transmission that have no relationship to the
government’s targeting criteria.181 In the upstream context, therefore, providing a
specific number will be technically difficult and not particularly illuminating about
the factors governing collection or use of § 702 data. The better course is to take
steps outlined earlier in this Article: limits on the querying of upstream U.S. person
data, which the FISC and the NSA have already imposed and Congress should
codify in § 702’s reauthorization, and requiring that the NSA use the best feasible
technology to limit incidental upstream collection of MCTs.
In the downstream context, requiring that the NSA provide a precise figure for
incidentally collected U.S. person data will pose another risk: supplying information
to our adversaries that will enable them to adjust their tradecraft to avoid detection.
In the tailored downstream program, disclosing the volume of incidentally collected
U.S. person data would provide important clues to our adversaries about the scope
of our intelligence capabilities. U.S. intelligence agencies may collect content and
metadata on virtually all of the contacts in the U.S. of tasked selectors.182
Intelligence analysts cast this wide net because they cannot know in advance which
contacts are significant and which are trivial or innocuous.183 Widespread
publication of a number that specifically indicates that U.S. intelligence agencies
cast a wide net may alert adversaries, encouraging them to adopt means to hinder
surveillance such as encryption or spoofed U.S. VPNs.184 The gain to public
deliberation supplied by such disclosures is outweighed by these adverse intelligence
consequences.
Finally, as a proponent of the quantification proposal concedes,185 the proposal
could undermine privacy. For MCTs collected upstream, the NSA can readily

180.

See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 56.
Id.
182.
FISA Amendments Act Oversight/Reauthorization: Senate Judiciary Committee-Hearing, 114th Cong.
(2015) (testimony of Matthew Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center) (last visited Sept. 11, 2016)
(explaining value of tracing possible U.S. contacts through hypothetical example involving two foreign targets
in Syria who share a U.S. person’s passport photo).
183.
See id. (observing that sharing a U.S. passport photo could be “innocent” but might signal a more
troubling link and would be of interest to the FBI).
184.
See Kris, supra note 1, at 22–24 (pointing to the fact that that ISIL has provided guidance to its
members and affiliates on the use of encryption and that this could extend to their use of TOR, VPNs or similar
services).
185.
See Senate Judiciary Committee May 2016 § 702 Hearing, supra note 4, at 10 (statement of David
Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board).
181.
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detect that the message does not match a tasked selector. However, the agency may
need to review substantially more of the transmission records and content of the
communication to determine if it involves U.S. persons. This inquiry will be
intrusive, perhaps involving human inspection.
That human review of
communications might be necessary to classify a communication as involving U.S.
persons, even when the communication would not be flagged in any query of
incidentally collected information and therefore might not come to any analyst’s
attention. In other words, the quantification task might require human review of
information that would otherwise not trigger human review prior to purging the
information. Quantification therefore poses a gratuitous risk of privacy intrusions
that Congress should avoid, not embrace.
V. CONCLUSION

In reauthorizing § 702, Congress faces fateful choices. One salient task is
reinforcing the strides in transparency and accountability that the intelligence
community made after Edward Snowden’s disclosures and that Congress codified
in the USA Freedom Act.186 However, a rigid approach would rob intelligence
analysts of the agility they need to protect the public against dynamic threats.187
This Article strives to reach a middle ground that combines effective foreign
intelligence collection with a concern for civil liberties.
Congress should do more to encourage the NSA to use technology as a tool to
enhance privacy. The NSA and the FBI already use technology to filter out certain
data that is irrelevant and prevent unauthorized access to databases.188 Congress
should build on these efforts without stifling innovation within the intelligence
community. To achieve these goals, Congress should mandate that the NSA use the
best feasible technology to limit incidental collection of U.S. person data.
On requirements for querying U.S. person data, Congress should expressly
recognize that collection under § 702 is a tale of two programs: the upstream
program that collects foreign intelligence at internet hubs, and the more tailored
downstream program, in which ISPs acquire only those communications that
match tasked selectors tied to terrorism, espionage, weapons proliferation, or other
national security and foreign affairs concerns. Currently, both the FISC and the IC
186.
Brand, Transparency, supra note 7 (commenting on National Intelligence’s plan to implement new
transparency principles as showing a new habit of transparency); see also Cordero, supra note 134 (describing
transparency principles announced by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper).
187.
[Name Redacted by Court], at 29 n.27 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (arguing the FBI’s current practice
which disallows downstream queries nonetheless gives the FBI the agility it needs).
188.
See id. at 28 (noting that technological safeguards applicable to FBI queries of § 702 data will deny
access to data if official posing query has not received proper training or is otherwise not authorized to obtain
access); see also Inglis & Kosseff, supra note 1, at 12 (explaining that although NSA has been unable to design
and implement a filter that reliably and uniformly collects only those specific emails in an MCT that are
responsive to specific search requests, the agency nonetheless filters emails in other contexts).
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rightly subject upstream collection to tighter regulation, because incidental
collection of irrelevant U.S. person communications is more likely in this space.189
Congress should codify these upstream constraints, requiring a court order for
querying of incidentally collected upstream communications.
In the downstream space, however, requiring a court order would be
inappropriate.190 Downstream collection is already far more tailored, and U.S.
person communications are more likely here than in the upstream context to reflect
national security or other foreign intelligence concerns.191 Requiring a court order
to query such information would make it more difficult for intelligence analysts to
connect the dots, without concomitant benefits for privacy.192
While rejecting an unduly rigid approach to intelligence collection,
reauthorization should enhance the FISC’s deliberations with a more
institutionalized public advocate. The system put in place by the USA Freedom Act,
in which the FISC can seek help from a panel of amici curiae, should be
supplemented by a public advocate who can push back against the government in a
wider range of cases. This opposing voice will help keep the government honest
and ensure that the FISC gets the range of views it needs for sound decisions.193
Transparency is also a part of this process. Here, too, Congress should enhance
the FISC’s deliberations, but legislate with a clear understanding of the nature of
both upstream and downstream collection. Surveillance critics’ call for an estimate
of the total number of incidentally collected U.S. person communications is
unworkable in the upstream program, where the shifting nature of efficient internet
transmissions and the NSA’s unavoidable collection of MCTs make a precise
number impossible to obtain.194 In the downstream program, an estimate would be
imprudent since it would publicize too much about the NSA’s capabilities.195
However, Congress should insist on greater transparency regarding the
government’s interactions with the FISC. For example, Congress should require
that the government disclose to both Congress and the public (using redactions

189.

See [Name Redacted by Court], at 44 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004,
1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (citing the “high degree of probability that requiring a warrant would hinder the
government’s ability to collect time-sensitive information”).
191.
[Name Redacted by Court], at 43–44 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015).
192.
See In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1011–12 (observing that requiring a warrant would “impede the vital
national security interests . . . at stake”).
193.
See Mondale, et al., supra note 18, at 2297–98 (arguing that as long as FISC proceedings don’t resemble
traditional warrant proceedings, there must be adverse positions presented); see also Vladeck, supra note 19, at
1176-77 (positing that one of the more common themes of calls for post-Snowden reforms to United States
surveillance law is to provide for more adversarial participation before the FISC).
194.
See DONOHUE, supra note 1, at 56–57.
195.
See Kris, supra note 1, at 22–24 (observing that alerting enemies of the NSA’s downstream capabilities
may encourage them to adopt encryption or VPNs).
190.
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when necessary) when the FISC expresses any concern about the candor of
government attorneys. That candor is central to the FISC’s work, especially when
the government makes ex parte requests.196 Candor serves as a bridge between the
government and the court, ensuring that the latter has the information it needs.197
Gaps in that bridge call for urgent maintenance. The prospect of expressly flagging
such gaps for Congress may have a useful ex ante effect, diminishing the incidence
of such episodes.198
In sum, ISIS’s rise makes reauthorization of § 702 an urgent priority. Fears of
terrorism should not disable the movement toward greater NSA transparency and
accountability. However, a nuanced view of the statute that distinguishes between
upstream and downstream collection is necessary to preserve the United States’
foreign intelligence capabilities. This Article has aimed to provide a blueprint for
that delicate balance.

196.

Goitein & Patel, supra note 4, at 46–47.
[Name Redacted by Court], at 59 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015) (describing the “heightened duty of candor
in ex parte proceedings” and the overall importance of candor in general).
198.
See supra Section IV (discussing the risks and benefits of transparency in this context); see also Gilson
& Mnookin, supra note 124, at 513 (hypothesizing that repeat litigators must protect their relationship with the
court and their reputation is key to success).
197.
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